Such submarines were designed primarily to counter Soviet ballistic missile and attack submarines. Today the principal threat to the U.S. submarine force is a non sequitur, the belief that because there is no Soviet threat, there is no function for weapons developed in response to that threat. Actually, the Jefferson City’s many capacities make it a fine fit for the nation’s evolving security challenges.
U.S. submarines were crucial in winning three wars–the world wars and the Cold War–and today may be what battleships and then aircraft carriers were: the capital ships–those vessels that, when present, control the sea. (Germany had only 62 submarines in 1989 and never had more than 100 at sea. but Churchill said they were his biggest source of anxiety and they nearly won control of the Atlantic.) Today 48 nations besides the United States have some of the world’s more than 600 submarines. China, which has a chip on its shoulder and the third largest submarine force, has six nuclear submarines. including a ballistic missile submarine, and is buying high-quality Kilo-class diesels from Russia. Iran also is buying Kilos, which are highly capable for a mission like closing the Strait of Hormuz. The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines is giving small nations enormous potential leverage in places like the Strait of Gibraltar and the Indonesian archipelago.
Highly mobile over three fifths of the planet, submarines are useful for sea control, including mining, and for supporting combatants ashore in littoral regions (within 250 miles of the shore) by missile attacks, reconnaissance and inserting commandos ashore. Asked if the end of the Cold War has made it difficult to motivate submariners. officers say there are plenty of challenges in becoming proficient at all the missions relevant to regional conflicts.
When in the 1982 Falklands war a British nuclear submarine sank the cruiser General Belgrano, the rest of the Argentine fleet returned to port. In littoral conflicts-which can include much of the earth’s strategically important land–even Third World nations can have mines and antiship missiles that deny adjacent waters to surface forces. Consider the potential for such conflicts along the crescent from Algeria to North Korea.
The Navy, with embarked Marines, is the principal instrument for the political uses of the armed forces, and submarines particularly demonstrate how crucial, subtle and varied those uses can be. The Navy often is “first to the fight” and submarines often are the first naval forces there. True, before there was nuclear propulsion. there really were no submarines–only vessels that could operate submerged for short periods. Today the presence of nuclear submarines can be covert, meaning nonprovocative, and sustained. An adversary knows they are there but is uncertain where. Submarines were the first really stealthy weapons and will be the most stealthy weapons until technology makes the oceans transparent, which will not happen soon. They force an adversary to divert substantial planning and material resources to the complex and expensive business of antisubmarine warfare.
These are just some of the reasons not even the transition from sail to steam was as momentous an event in naval history as the signal from the USS Nautilus on Jan. 17, 1955: “Underway on nuclear power.” And these are among the reasons Congress probably will, and certainly should, complete the purchase of the third Seawolf submarine. It will carry 80 percent more weapons than the Jefferson City and will be quieter at tactical speed than the Jefferson City is when moored at a pier. Completion will cost about $1.5 billion. But $900 million has been spent on the power plant and other components. Termination costs would be at least $700 million. And termination would be a blow to the national security component of the nation’s industrial base, destroying the Electric Boat company and leaving only one shipyard capable of building nuclear submarines. Creating another yard from scratch might cost $6 billion. Completion would bridge the gap until 1998, when production will begin on a new attack submarine. It will be less capable than Seawolf (it will be as quiet but not as fast and will carry fewer weapons) but 80 percent less expensive.
Opponents of the third seawolf say it is unnecessary because Russia is no longer competitive. They say that with Russian forces fighting in semi-civil wars, with officers home from Eastern Europe living in boxcars and with the surface fleet rusting at piers, Russia has higher priorities than building quieter submarines. But it is building them. In 1998 Russia’s Minister of Defense, General Grachev, said, “A nuclear submarine fleet is the future of the armed forces.” By the year 2000,12 Russian submarines will be quieter than the Jefferson City.
Perhaps it is the case, as many American advocates of curtailed defense spending seem to postulate, that the United States will never again confront a Challenge greater than a regional conflict, and that Russia will forever be a friendly, noncompetitive power. Perhaps. But the post-Cold War contraction of defense capability is the nation’s third demobilization in this century–the fourth if you count the post-Vietnam contraction that ended with the Reagan buildup that helped end the Cold War. And the history of this century teaches a grim truth: When at peace the nation should always assume that it may be living in what subsequent historians will call “interwar years.”
